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THE NATURE OF QUISTCLOSE TRUSTS:
CLASSIFICATION AND RECONCILIATION
J.A. GLISTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE facts of Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Quistclose Investments Ltd. are
well-known.1 In July 1964 Rolls Razor Ltd. declared a dividend
payment that they were unable to meet. In order to meet their
obligation, the company arranged to borrow the amount of the
dividend, £210,000, from Quistclose Investments. The money was
duly transferred into a separate account of Rolls Razor, opened
specially for the purpose, held at Barclays Bank. The dividend was
payable on 24 July but had not been paid when, on 27 August,
Rolls Razor entered voluntary liquidation. Barclays and Quistclose
both claimed the money. Barclays asserted a right of set-oﬀ against
the Rolls Razor overdraft, while Quistclose claimed that the money
was held in trust for them and, since Barclays were aware of this,
the bank were accordingly constructive trustees of the funds.
Quistclose won. A unanimous House of Lords agreed that the
funds were held in trust and that Barclays had the necessary notice
of the arrangement. However, several issues were left open. Firstly,
Lord Wilberforce referred to a ‘‘primary’’ trust for the creditors,
and a ‘‘secondary’’ trust for the lender, yet the mechanics and
nature of these trusts were not explored. Lord Wilberforce never
categorised the ‘‘secondary’’ trust as express, resulting or
constructive, nor did he comment on the issue of enforcement of
the ‘‘primary’’ trust. Secondly, the scope of the Quistclose analysis
was not deﬁned. Quistclose itself involved an attempted ﬁnancial
rescue, as did the earlier cases that Lord Wilberforce approved.2
Does this mean that the analysis can only apply in such cases,3 or
* Lecturer in Law, University of Durham. I would like to thank Janet Ulph and Professor Tom
Allen for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. Any remaining errors are my own.
1 Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Quistclose Investments Ltd. [1970] A.C. 567.
2 Toovey v. Milne (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 683; Edwards v. Glyn (1859) 2 E. & E. 29; Re Rogers
(1891) 8 Morr. 243; Re Drucker (No. 1) [1902] 2 K.B. 237.
3 Discussing the line of cases prior to Quistclose, Swadling comments: ‘‘they form an anomalous
rule applicable only to the law of bankruptcy and, for that reason, cannot be applied outside
that context’’. W. Swadling, ‘‘A New Role for Resulting Trusts?’’ (1996) 16 L.S. 110, p. 122.
See also Re Associated Securities [1981] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 742.
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is the underlying principle that property transferred for a speciﬁc
purpose will be held on trust?4
This paper is concerned with the categorisation of Quistclose
arrangements, an issue necessarily tied up with that of enforcement.
Certain relationships, such as express trustee/beneﬁciary, have
common proprietary consequences.5 Thus the classiﬁcation of a
device as, for example, an express trust for a third party, would
have the corollary of allowing that person to enforce the trust.
Similarly, if parties did not label the transaction but contemplated
that the third party would have a right to enforce the trust, it
might be that the third party would be found to have a beneﬁcial
interest. In this way classiﬁcation is necessarily made by both legal
principle and the parties’ chosen allocation of rights and liabilities.
How one aﬀects the other is a central thesis of this article.
Various commentators have argued that Quistclose arrangements
should properly be termed express, resulting or constructive trusts.6
Further, it has been argued that—at least while the purpose is still
capable of fulﬁlment—Quistclose trusts are in fact not trusts at all
but rather instances where both legal and beneﬁcial title are held by
the borrower, with the transferor holding only an equitable right to
restrain the borrower’s misuse of the funds.7 The various
possibilities are discussed and criticised below. It will be argued that
these theories as to the nature of the Quistclose trust are not
necessarily mutually exclusive and that there is no single ‘‘right
answer’’: the ﬁnding of an express trust in one Quistclose-type
situation would not preclude the ﬁnding of a resulting trust in
another. As mentioned above, classiﬁcation and an analysis of the
parties’ agreement necessarily inform each other: depending on that
agreement it may in any given situation be more appropriate to
categorise the relationship as that of express trust, resulting trust,
or of no trust at all.
Security for the lender
In Twinsectra v. Yardley, Lord Millett remarked in the context of
Quistclose trusts that the ‘‘whole purpose of the arrangements . . . is
to prevent the money from passing to the borrower’s trustee-in-
4 As seems to be the correct view. See Twinsectra Ltd. v. Yardley and others [2002] UKHL 12,
[2002] 2 A.C. 164, at [68] per Lord Millett: ‘‘In the earlier cases the purpose was to enable the
borrower to pay his creditors or some of them, but the principle is not limited to such cases.’’
5 For example the right of absolutely-entitled, sui juris beneﬁciaries to terminate an express trust:
Saunders v. Vautier (1841) 4 Beav. 115.
6 Should the Quistclose trust not ﬁt into one of these three categories a further option is that it
should be considered sui generis: see J. Payne, ‘‘Quistclose and Resulting Trusts’’, in P. Birks &
F. Rose (eds.), Restitution and Equity vol. 1 (London 2000), ch. 5. As will become apparent,
this author believes that Quistclose trusts are adequately served by the normal labels.
7 R. Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford 1997), ch. 3.
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bankruptcy in the event of his insolvency’’.8 That is, a ‘‘true’’
Quistclose trust is characterised by the transferor retaining some
form of security over the property. It is, of course, possible for
parties to construct an arrangement whereby A transfers property
to B to enable B to pay C and A does not retain any security in
the advanced funds. It is not contended that such a transaction
would be invalid due to the lack of A’s security, merely that the
lack of security would prevent the arrangement from being termed
a Quistclose trust within the meaning of Lord Millett’s analysis.
Correspondingly, the fact that a transferor holds security does
not automatically make the arrangement a Quistclose one: the
security may be held by way of charge, or the property may have
been advanced subject to a retention of title clause. However, it is
argued that a lack of security on A’s part will make a Quistclose
analysis unavailable. It has already been mentioned that this would
not make the transaction invalid, so it may be thought that the
distinction is rather academic. As will become apparent it is used
simply as a way of distinguishing between those trust constructions
where the beneﬁcial interest is in A (‘‘true’’ Quistclose), and those
where the equitable title is in C (still a trust, but not of the
Quistclose type).
II. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP IN C—TRUST FOR THE THIRD PARTY
If A transfers money to B subject to the condition that it only be
used to pay C, it could be that a trust for C is created whereby B
is the trustee. That is, A’s direction that B should use the money
for C may go beyond a vague intention to beneﬁt and become an
intention that C has the right to use and enjoy the beneﬁt of that
money.9 There is some support for this view that the beneﬁcial
interest vests in the third party. In Quistclose itself Lord
Wilberforce said that ‘‘arrangements of this character for the
payment of a person’s creditors by a third person, give rise to a
relationship of a ﬁduciary character or trust, in favour, as a
primary trust, of the creditors, and secondarily, if the primary trust
fails, of the third person’’.10 Extra-judicially, Lord Millett has
expressed similar views. In 1985 he wrote: ‘‘If A’s intention was to
beneﬁt C, or his object would be frustrated if he were to retain a
power of revocation, the transaction will create an irrevocable trust
in favour of C, enforceable by C but not by A. The beneﬁcial
interest in the trust property will be in C.’’11
8 [2002] 2 A.C. 164, at [82].
9 See Paul v. Constance [1977] 1 W.L.R. 527.
10 [1970] A.C. 567, 580.
11 P.J. Millett, ‘‘The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It?’’ (1985) 101 L.Q.R. 269, p. 290.
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The case of Hassall v. Smithers is also worth noting, although it
may ask as many questions as it answers.12 Funds were provided to
enable the recipient to discharge certain debts he had incurred.
However, the recipient soon died, intestate, without having satisﬁed
these debts. The provider of the funds brought a joint action with
the deceased’s creditors and they were able to compel the
deceased’s representative to pay oﬀ the debts. This could be seen as
the creditors (C) having a right to compel performance, which
would suggest that they were the beneﬁcial owners. However, it
could also be argued that it was the action of the provider (A) that
was successful, as he had retained the beneﬁcial interest
throughout.13
Of course there is nothing abhorrent about the idea of A
transferring property to B, directing that it be held on trust for C.
In most cases this transfer will create a simple express trust with B
holding as trustee for C and the settlor, A, dropping out of the
picture as a stranger to the trust.14 However, there are some
important considerations that must be addressed. Firstly, although
the model above assumes that A is the settlor, it could also be B.
On this construction B would borrow money from A to enable B
to create a trust in favour of C: thus B settles the trust. If A
intended that the money would end up in C’s hands then the
situation is less clear: the beneﬁcial interest may pass straight from
A to C. However, it is suggested that the level of A’s knowledge or
intention must be carefully scrutinised to see whether it is suﬃcient
to eﬀect the creation of a trust. If it is, then A is the settlor and B
only ever receives legal title. However, it is more likely that A will
recognise and contemplate that C will gain the ultimate beneﬁt of
the funds, but that this recognition will not be enough to show the
requisite certainty of intention to create a trust.
The identity of the settlor may be crucial if the deal involves tax
considerations, or if the trust for C is settled shortly before B’s
insolvency.15 The capacity of B to create trusts may be a further
12 (1806) 12 Ves. 119.
13 The Court did not answer this question: see L. Ho & P. St. J. Smart, ‘‘Re-interpreting the
Quistclose Trust: A Critique of Chambers’ Analysis’’ (2001) 21 O.J.L.S. 267, p. 279.
14 As Chambers points out, the transfer could also take eﬀect as a secret (constructive) trust if
the transfer was part of a testamentary disposition that did not satisfy the requirements of the
Wills Act 1837: R. Chambers, ‘‘Restrictions on the Use of Money’’ in W. Swadling (ed.), The
Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays (Oxford 2004), ch. 5.
15 There seem to be two possible lines of reasoning as to why such a device would not be a
preference. In Re Kayford [1975] 1 W.L.R. 279, 281, it was thought that the question was not
one of preferring particular creditors, but rather of preventing donors of money from
becoming creditors (by making them beneﬁciaries instead). The case has been criticised on this
point, and the weakness is amply demonstrated by D. Waters in ‘‘The Trust in the Setting of
Business, Commerce and Bankruptcy’’ (1983) 21 Alberta L.R. 395, p. 417.
Alternatively, following the distinction drawn by Millett J. in Re MC Bacon Ltd. [1990]
B.C.L.C. 324, one could argue that whilst the debtor company may have intended to prefer
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issue. Much more importantly for our purposes, though, the
identity of the settlor tells us who receives the money in the event
of the trust failing for uncertainty of objects. Should C be ill-
deﬁned, extinct or otherwise unidentiﬁable then the beneﬁcial
interest will revert to the settlor with B either holding on trust for
A or obtaining full beneﬁcial and legal title for himself.16
A situation is therefore conceivable whereby A transfers money
to B, contemplating that B will use it to beneﬁt C. However, A’s
contemplation, or indeed intention, is not suﬃcient to make her the
settlor of the trust: instead the money is transferred to B who
declares herself trustee of it in favour of C. It then transpires that
C does not exist and the beneﬁcial interest reverts on resulting trust
to B as the settlor. A will almost certainly have a contractual claim
against B, as it is very likely that B has borrowed the money from
A, but this will provide little security in an insolvency situation. It
may be possible to imply an intention that the beneﬁcial interest
should revert to A in the event of C being unidentiﬁable. However,
this would be the equivalent of B declaring herself trustee in favour
of A and would have the attendant problems regarding certainty of
intention, preferences, and the capacity to create trusts.
We must also consider the mechanics of the trust whilst the
purpose is still capable of fulﬁlment. Here the identity of the settlor
is irrelevant: as long as the beneﬁcial interest is vested in C it does
not matter whether A created the trust or B declared himself
trustee of money received from A. C is the beneﬁcial owner while B
holds legal title. B will owe ﬁduciary duties to C as trustee and
may also owe contractual duties to A, both in terms of repayment
of the loan and of fulﬁlling the purpose for which the loan was
made.17 In Twinsectra Lords Millett and Hoﬀmann spoke of the
recipient (B) holding a power to apply the funds for the speciﬁed
purpose,18 although at the time their Lordships were clearly
the creditor company, it did not necessarily desire to. That is, a declaration of trust would
only be vulnerable if there was a positive desire to improve the creditor’s position, rather than
simply an appreciation of the necessity of such an act. This is a stronger ground on which to
deny a preference but it must be recognised, as the judge, Robert Wright QC, noted in Re
Beacon Leisure Ltd. [1991] B.C.C. 213, that the distinction may be very small. In short, a
declaration of trust in the run up to insolvency may still be vulnerable to claims that the
device created a preference. See further G. McCormack, Proprietary Claims and Insolvency
(London 1997), pp. 58–64.
16 It is important to note that we are concerned here with a trust failing initially for uncertainty
of objects, not subsequently because of B’s supervening insolvency. In that circumstance the
funds will not be available for distribution amongst B’s other creditors as the beneﬁcial
ownership of those funds would already be in C.
17 It is recognised that A obligating B by contract to beneﬁt C could easily be construed as A
intending the beneﬁcial interest to pass straight to C. However, this does not conﬂict with the
notion of B owing contractual duties to A, and those duties replicating proprietary obligations
that B owes to C. (Note also, of course, the potential application of the Contracts (Rights of
Third Parties) Act 1999.)
18 [2002] 2 A.C. 164, at [13]–[16] per Lord Hoﬀmann, and at [101] per Lord Millett.
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contemplating the beneﬁcial interest in the money to be in A.19 It is
rather redundant to speak of B having a power to beneﬁt C when
C is the beneﬁcial owner. As regards A, B may have a contractual
duty to pay C. As regards C, B will be susceptible to C terminating
the trust.20
Problems and Classiﬁcation: is this a Quistclose trust?
It is not doubted that the beneﬁcial interest could vest in C in a
transaction that appeared very similar to a Quistclose situation.
However, it is argued that such a transaction should not properly
be termed a Quistclose trust. The very essence of such a device is
that it protects A’s interests in the event of B’s insolvency.21 It
could be argued that if A directed B to apply the funds to C, then
A’s interest would be adequately protected through the beneﬁt
gained by C: after all, this is what A desired in the ﬁrst place. A
could also protect the investment de facto by taking security over
some of B’s other assets. However, B may be incapable of giving
such security, and it may be doubted whether such a course would
be a commercially realistic route for A to take. Other than these
frankly unsatisfactory suggestions, A’s options—and security—
would be severely limited.
Under this construction the only right A could have to compel
performance would be contractual,22 and indeed this is also
problematic: what if B contracts with A to give the money to C in
regular instalments, but C as beneﬁciary then directs B to give him
all the money at once, terminating the trust? C could even
terminate the trust and direct B to pay the money to someone
else.23 B has to comply with the wishes of his beneﬁciary, but in
doing so necessarily breaches his contract with A.24 The House of
Lords in Quistclose held that the lender actually has ‘‘an equitable
right to see that [the funds] are applied for the primary designated
purpose’’.25 But how strong is this equitable right when facing the
19 Lords Millett and Hoﬀmann may have disagreed over whether this was through the
mechanism of an express trust or a resulting trust: see n. 62 below.
20 C is an absolutely-entitled beneﬁciary and so may terminate the trust under the principle in
Saunders v. Vautier (1841) 4 Beav. 115.
21 See quotation cited above, n. 8.
22 This may conﬂict with the decision in Hassall v. Smithers (1806) 12 Ves. 119, depending on
one’s view of that case.
23 Re Marshall [1914] 1 Ch. 192; Re Sandeman’s WT [1937] 1 All E.R. 368.
24 This would still be a problem even if C had agreed not to direct B in this way. C’s
proprietary rights ‘‘trump’’ his contractual obligations. See J. Glister, ‘‘Twinsectra v. Yardley:
Trusts, Powers and Contractual Obligations’’ (2002) 16 Trust Law International 223, p. 228.
25 ‘‘Equitable’’ may refer to a personal right enforceable by injunction, or to a proprietary right.
The ‘‘equitable’’ right of the lender in Chambers’ thesis is of the former kind: see discussion
below, nn. 37–41 and associated text. For the purposes of the current discussion the
distinction is irrelevant: the question is the strength of this right against the directions of an
absolutely-entitled beneﬁciary.
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directions of an absolutely-entitled beneﬁciary? If C’s interest is
subject to A’s equitable right then it is diﬃcult to see how C could
truly be the beneﬁcial owner. If, on the other hand, C’s beneﬁcial
interest outweighs any equitable right of A then A’s security is
again limited.
Most importantly, though, if B becomes insolvent having
applied half the funds for the agreed purpose, it is diﬃcult to see
how the other half could revert to A. This would be necessary for
A to have any security, and thus necessary for this ‘‘trust for C’’
construction to be a ‘‘true’’ Quistclose trust. C has been the
beneﬁcial owner of all the money since the start of the
arrangement,26 and at the time of B’s insolvency C has been paid—
and thus acquired legal title to—half of the money. The purpose
has been fulﬁlled as far as this half is concerned, whilst the other
half is still owned by B on trust for C. How does A get it back?
This is the ‘‘secondary’’ trust that Lord Wilberforce spoke about in
Quistclose.27
A cannot unilaterally remove C’s beneﬁcial interest in the
money, and neither can B. The only way would be to either impute
an unlikely intention to C that he transfers his equitable interest in
the remaining funds back to A, or to consider that C keeping the
interest in the remaining money would be unconscionable: also, it is
suggested, unlikely. It has been argued that a true Quistclose trust is
characterised by the lender, A, retaining some form of security.28
Such an arrangement is not possible if the beneﬁcial interest in the
transferred funds is taken to be in the creditor C.
Returning to Lord Millett’s extra-judicial writing, he asserts that
if ‘‘[A’s] object would be frustrated if he were to retain a power of
revocation, the transaction will create an irrevocable trust in favour
of C’’.29 Yet it would be a rare situation where A’s object would be
so frustrated: no doubt C would prefer it if A did not have a
power of revocation, but A’s foremost consideration will be the
protection of his own investment. Should this not be his foremost
consideration, A is always free to simply give the money to C or
loan it to B without attempting any form of security. To
summarise; it is suggested that a trust for third parties of the kind
that Lord Millett envisaged, whilst of course conceivable, is not a
true Quistclose-type trust. The trust for third parties encounters
problems when applied to insolvency situations and, whilst it is
recognised that Quistclose does not only apply here, it is suggested
26 Whether the settlor was A or B.
27 [1970] A.C. 567. See also discussion below, Section IV, of the trust being for A, whereupon
the distinction between primary and secondary trusts collapses.
28 See above, n. 8, and associated text.
29 Millett, ‘‘The Quistclose Trust’’ (1985) 101 L.Q.R. 269, p. 290.
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that the use of a ‘‘trust for C’’ construction would rather
undermine the point of employing a Quistclose device in those
situations. Perhaps the point is better made from another angle:
that is, the lack of security for A’s advance would undermine any
attempt to argue that A had not intended the beneﬁcial ownership
to vest in C.
III. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP IN B—NO TRUST
It is clear that if B borrows money from A the beneﬁcial interest in
that money will normally be in B, with B owing A the money at
common law under a contract of loan.30 This will be the case
whether or not B intends to pay C with the money. It will also be
the case if A knows that B intends to pay C. We are concerned
with the point at which A’s knowledge and intentions regarding B’s
use of the money alter the location of the beneﬁcial interest in
those funds. When discussing the possibility of the beneﬁcial
interest being in C it was argued that either A or B would need to
show the requisite certainty of intention to create a trust in favour
of C.31 If the requisite certainty of intention to create a trust for C
is not present then we must determine where the beneﬁcial interest
lies: A or B.
If A merely contemplates that B will use the funds for a speciﬁc
purpose then B will receive unrestricted beneﬁcial ownership.32 A
good illustration is the recent Australian case of Roxborough v.
Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd., where the appellants were
tobacco retailers who bought cigarettes from Rothmans, a
wholesaler.33 Tobacco wholesalers and retailers in New South Wales
were required to pay a licence fee to the State, but any products in
respect of which a fee had already been paid by the wholesaler
were disregarded in the calculation of the retailer’s fee. Roxborough
bought tobacco from Rothmans and was duly invoiced for the
price, with the amount due being expressly apportioned between the
30 Strictly speaking, a person solely entitled to both legal and beneﬁcial estates in property does
not have an equitable interest: the legal title carries with it all the rights. See Commissioner of
Stamp Duties (Queensland) v. Livingston [1965] A.C. 694, 712 per Viscount Radcliﬀe;
Vandervell v. I.R.C. [1967] 2 A.C. 291, 311 per Lord Upjohn; Westdeutsche Landesbank
Girozentrale v. Islington L.B.C. [1996] A.C. 669, 706 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. In this
discussion the beneﬁcial and legal title will normally be kept separate, for ease of expression,
even when they vest in the same person. However, the issue does become important when
discussing the possibility of A ‘‘retaining’’ rather than ‘‘obtaining’’ the equitable interest. See
discussion below, nn. 68–73 and associated text.
31 Depending on who is considered the settlor.
32 In Re Osoba [1979] 2 All E.R. 393 a man left money to his wife on trust for his daughter’s
‘‘training up to university grade’’. It was held that the daughter took unrestricted ownership.
See also Re Bowes [1896] 1 Ch. 507 where a trust was expressed as being for the planting of
trees. It was held that the owners of the relevant estate took free of any trust, the tree
planting being considered as merely expressing a motive.
33 (2001) 185 A.L.R. 335.
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actual cost of the cigarettes and the proportionate amount of the
licence fee. In eﬀect, Rothmans passed on the fee to its retailers.
The licence fee was subsequently held to be constitutionally invalid
by the High Court, but the retailers had already paid certain sums
to Rothmans in anticipation of licence fees payable in the future.
Since the invoices had speciﬁcally mentioned amounts payable as
regards the licence fee, could the appellants claim that those sums
of money now held by Rothmans were held on trust for them?34
In the High Court, Gleeson C.J., Gaudron and Hayne JJ.,
found that ‘‘the tax component of the net total wholesale cost was
treated as a distinct and separate element by the parties’’.35 It could
thus be argued that, given A’s clear contemplation that the money
be applied for a speciﬁc purpose, B did not receive unrestricted
beneﬁcial ownership. However, although the parties considered the
tax money to be severable from the rest of the contract, it did not
necessarily follow that they also intended the further step of
intending the beneﬁcial interest in the tax money to remain in the
donor (or at least restricting the beneﬁcial ownership of the
wholesaler). As Gummow J. held: ‘‘That is not to maintain that
Rothmans failed to acquire ownership in specie of the funds it was
paid; nor does it mean that Rothmans was obliged to earmark and
keep those funds separate or otherwise treat them as if they were
impressed with trusts in favour of the appellants.’’36
In that case the intention was not ‘‘strong’’ enough to prevent B
from receiving full ownership of the funds. What is required is a
binding condition that the relevant money will only be used for a
speciﬁc purpose. Simply put, if it had been contended that a
Quistclose trust existed in Roxborough, the High Court could have
said: ‘‘it is accepted that the retailers paid a speciﬁc and severable
amount of money to Rothmans so that they could pay the licence
fee; but we do not accept that the parties intended that that speciﬁc
property itself should necessarily be the money applied’’.
The lender’s right—personal or proprietary?
Chambers argues that the existence of a binding condition need not
necessarily mean that the beneﬁcial interest remains in A, but
34 Interestingly, in the Full Federal Court the retailers had conceded that Rothmans had not
received money on terms of a Quistclose trust. This was because there was no obligation to
keep the ‘‘tax money’’ segregated. Bryan and Ellinghaus question the need for this concession
in ‘‘Fault Lines in the Law of Obligations: Roxborough v. Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia
Ltd.’’ (2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 636, p. 664, n. 101; and the current author has argued
elswhere that a requirement of segregation is not necessarily determinative in these cases:
Glister, ‘‘Twinsectra v. Yardley: Trusts, Powers and Contractual Obligations’’ (2002) 16 Trust
Law International 223, p. 230.
35 (2001) 185 A.L.R. 335, 342.
36 (2001) 185 A.L.R. 335, 350.
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rather that B can receive the beneﬁcial ownership, albeit restricted
by that condition.37 The existence of the condition as a restriction
on B’s ownership would carry with it a right, exercisable by A, to
restrain B’s misuse.38 The nature of this right is important: if it is a
merely personal right then A’s security is denied as the right will
not be enforceable against third parties.39 Yet if the right is a
proprietary right then it is diﬃcult to identify. In acknowledging
that it does not ﬁt into the accepted categories of proprietary rights
to money,40 Chambers argues that we are dealing with a form of
personal right that developed in parallel with restrictive covenants
in land and the De Mattos v. Gibson principle.41 In short, the
Quistclose right is a personal right to money that should have, but
never did, make the transition into a proprietary right.
As mentioned above, the problem with A’s right being merely
personal is that the level of security that that would aﬀord is less
than if the right was of the proprietary kind.42 Under this
construction once the purpose had failed A would become the
beneﬁciary of a resulting trust. However, A’s position before the
trust fails may also be important, and it is unclear whether
Chambers’ analysis adequately accounts for this situation. Not only
is there the problem of A’s right to restrain being a merely
contractual right; it may also be legitimately questioned whether
Quistclose cases are indeed characterised by the lender’s right to
restrain misuse rather than, at least in some cases, a right to
compel performance. In Gibert v. Gonard, North J. appeared to be
mindful of a right to compel when he observed that ‘‘if [a recipient]
chooses to accept the money tendered for a particular purpose, it is
his duty, and there is a legal obligation on him, to apply it for that
purpose’’.43 Similarly, in Hassall v. Smithers, Grant M.R. held that
the ‘‘intestate was bound so to apply that remittance’’.44 Ho and
37 Chambers, Resulting Trusts, pp. 73–78.
38 Note that even if the right is purely personal A could still seek speciﬁc performance of B’s
obligations by injunction: Conservative and Unionist Central Oﬃce v. Burrell [1982] 2 All E.R.
1.
39 It might be that as soon as B misapplied any money the rest could revert to A on resulting
trust, because in those circumstances it was never intended that B should have full ownership.
See discussion below, n. 52. However, and in any case, a resulting trust construction involving
the remaining property does not account for the money that has already been misapplied.
Chambers, ‘‘Restrictions on the Use of Money’’, in Swadling (ed.), The Quistclose Trust,
points out that this misapplied money would normally have disappeared anyway, either into
the hands of a bona ﬁde purchaser or received by a innocent volunteer who has since changed
their position. This may often be true, but not all the time and it is suggested that it would
still be clearly more beneﬁcial to A to be able to exercise a proprietary right.
40 Ownership, possession, a right of rescission and security interests.
41 Chambers ‘‘Restrictions on the Use of Money’’, pp. 94–97, discussing Tulk v. Moxhay (1848)
41 E.R. 1143; De Mattos v. Gibson (1859) 45 E.R. 108.
42 Neither would aﬀord as much security as beneﬁcial ownership, discussed below.
43 (1884) 54 L.J. Ch. 439, 440.
44 (1806) 12 Ves. 119, 121.
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Smart also point out that ‘‘if counsel had asked the directors of the
plaintiﬀ in Quistclose whether it was intended that Rolls Razor
might sit on the money (for an indeterminate time) or, alternatively,
that Rolls Razor had (within a reasonable time) to use the money
to pay oﬀ the dividend, one suspects an obvious reply would have
been forthcoming’’.45
At least in some cases, it seems that B’s application of the funds
for the speciﬁc purpose is obligatory, not permissive. That is, B is
under a positive obligation to apply the funds, not merely a
negative obligation to not misapply them. Ho and Smart contend
that Chambers’ view is ‘‘unavailable’’ in these cases involving
positive obligations: the existence of a positive obligation would
necessarily mean that ‘‘the ‘entire beneﬁcial ownership’ of the
money could scarcely be in the lender’’.46 This seems
irreproachable, and received support from Lord Millett in
Twinsectra.47 Lord Millett did not accept Chambers’ opinions
regarding the nature of the lender’s right to restrain misuse:
The duty is not contractual but ﬁduciary. It may exist despite
the absence of any contract at all between the parties, as in
Rose v. Rose (1986) 7 NSWLR 679; and it binds third parties
as in the Quistclose case itself. The duty is ﬁduciary in
character because a person who makes money available on
terms that it is to be used for a particular purpose only and
not for any other purpose thereby places his trust and
conﬁdence in the recipient to ensure that it is properly applied.
This is a classic situation in which a ﬁduciary relationship
arises, and since it arises in respect of a speciﬁc fund it gives
rise to a trust.48
Reconciliation
In his recent piece on Quistclose, Chambers acknowledged that his
model was not universally applicable, but maintained that the
analysis should still stand as a legal device that may be employed
by parties who choose to do so.49 However, although the potential
existence on certain facts of a ‘‘no-trust’’ construction can be
accepted,50 it is argued that there is more to be said about the
relationship between the diﬀerent models of Chambers and Millett.
45 Ho and Smart ‘‘Re-interpreting the Quistclose Trust’’ (2001) 21 O.J.L.S. 267, p. 278.
46 Ibid. (footnote omitted).
47 [2002] 2 A.C. 164, at [95].
48 [2002] 2 A.C. 164, at [76]. For further discussion of ﬁduciary duties in this context see below,
nn. 74–80 and associated text.
49 Chambers, ‘‘Restrictions on the Use of Money’’, p. 88. In his 1997 book Chambers had
appeared to think that the two models were necessarily inconsistent: Resulting Trusts, p. 86.
50 Chambers admitted that a resulting trust model ‘‘may even be the most likely outcome when
a binding restriction on the use of money does not create an express trust’’: Chambers,
‘‘Restrictions on the Use of Money’’.
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What circumstances would give rise to one or the other, given that
parties’ express wishes may well be absent?51
It is suggested that it is necessary once more to separate positive
and negative obligations. Lord Millett’s words seem to suggest a
positive duty, i.e. the ﬁduciary duty arises when A trusts that B will
properly apply the money; when A makes money available on
terms that it is to be used for a particular purpose only. To
disregard these terms would be unconscionable. Chambers on the
other hand is concerned with cases involving negative duties: where
B may not spend the money on anything else, but is not actually
compelled to apply the money. It may seem a very narrow
distinction, but could it not be argued that it is the intention of the
parties that B be compelled to apply the funds that is crucial? That
is, if the parties agree that B will not use the money for anything
other than C then no ﬁduciary relationship arises: if B misapplies
the money then A is left to his remedy in contract.52 However, if
they agree that B must spend the money on C then B becomes A’s
ﬁduciary. There is clearly a distinction between being compelled to
do something and merely being at liberty to do so: in this
circumstance it is suggested that the distinction determines where
the beneﬁcial ownership in property lies.53
Chambers’ model has also been criticised for being unable to
apply in instances where the transfer is not pursuant to a
contract.54 In this situation, so the argument goes, there would be
no basis for a contractual right to prevent misuse, and so the duty
must be ﬁduciary. It is suggested that this is somewhat misleading:
the contract exists as evidence of the parties’ intentions as to the
beneﬁcial ownership of the funds. I have argued that if the contract
creates a positive duty on the part of the recipient, B, then that is
indicative of an intention that B should not be the equitable owner.
51 Express wishes might also by their existence result in another construction entirely: that of an
express trust.
52 A is left to this remedy for the money that has already been misapplied. Any remaining funds
will be held by A beneﬁcially under a resulting trust: see above, n. 39. One consequence of
this analysis might appear surprising: following an initial misapplication this model would
suggest that any further application of property—even precisely within the original
agreement—would be unlawful. This might seem unpalatable to innocent volunteers dealing
with trust property within the original purpose. Perhaps we could construct the resulting
trustee B as also holding a power to apply the funds to the original purpose: that is, although
the misapplication gave rise to a resulting trust, this is a matter of presumed intention and is
not the same as saying that the trust sprang up because the purpose had failed. Failure of
purpose would give rise to a resulting trust, but that is not to say that only a failure of
purpose may do so.
53 Lord Millett, [2002] 2 A.C. 164, at [76], stated that it would be ‘‘unconscionable for a man to
obtain money on terms as to its application and then disregard the terms on which he
received it’’. It is suggested that this supports the suggested distinction: if B receives money
under a negative obligation, then as long as he does not misapply it he is not disregarding the
terms on which he received those funds.
54 See the comments of Lord Millett in Twinsectra v. Yardley [2002] 2 A.C. 164, at [95], and
those of Ho and Smart, ‘‘Re-interpreting the Quistclose Trust’’ (2001) 21 O.J.L.S. 267, p. 279.
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B has undertaken to apply the funds for a purpose, A has reposed
trust and conﬁdence in B to this eﬀect, and B is therefore A’s
ﬁduciary. If the agreement does not create a positive duty to apply
the money, then there is no ﬁduciary relationship. It so happens
that, in a case where this transfer was pursuant to a contract, A
may have a contractual right to prevent misuse. Yet Chambers’
model does not suggest that it automatically follows that voluntary
transfers cannot involve ﬁduciary relationships: it merely asserts
that there is no contract that can be used as evidence to determine
whether the parties intended a relationship that the law may
classify as ﬁduciary. Evidence must be sought from other means: a
non-contract transfer may or may not involve ﬁduciary duties on
the part of the recipient. The only diﬀerence is that where a non-
contract transfer does not involve ﬁduciary duties there will also
not be any contractual duties upon which the transferor could
rely.55
IV. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP IN A—TRUST FOR THE LENDER
In 1985, Lord Millett proposed that under a Quistclose trust the
beneﬁcial ownership of the transferred property might remain in the
lender.56 This suggestion ‘‘cleared away a lot of the fog’’57 in the
Quistclose area and was received with considerable academic and
judicial favour.58 The construction has also been recently adopted
by the House of Lords in Twinsectra v. Yardley.59 When A transfers
funds to B, B does not take them beneﬁcially but instead holds the
money on trust for A, under either an express trust or resulting
trust. B becomes the holder of a power to apply the funds for C,
the agreed purpose.60
55 Again, as soon as some of the property is misapplied the rest of the funds will be held by the
transferor on resulting trust: above, n. 39 and 52.
56 Millett, ‘‘The Quistclose Trust’’ (1985) 101 L.Q.R. 269.
57 The phrase is Chambers’: Resulting Trusts, p. 74.
58 See in particular M. Bridge, ‘‘The Quistclose Trust in a World of Secured Transactions’’
(1992) 12 O.J.L.S. 333, p. 352; and J. Priestley, ‘‘The Romalpa Clause and the Quistclose
Trust’’, in P.D. Finn (ed.) Equity and Commercial Relationships (Syndey 1987), ch. 8, p. 237.
The construction was also adopted by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in General
Communications Ltd. v. Development Finance Corp. of New Zealand Ltd. [1990] 3 N.Z.L.R.
406, and was favourably considered by Gummow J. in the Australian Federal Court in Re
Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust (1991) 102 A.L.R. 681.
59 [2002] 2 A.C. 164.
60 On the personal level B will almost certainly owe a contractual duty to A to apply the funds
to C. As a matter of property law B holds on trust for A, but B also has a power to beneﬁt
C. That is, the parties’ understanding that B must apply the funds to C provides the equitable
basis for the ﬁduciary power. Evidence of this understanding will almost always be in a
contract. However, if the intention that B should be compelled to apply the funds can be
adduced from other sources then a ‘‘trust for A’’ construction will still be available.
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Express trust for A
The lender, A, may hold the beneﬁcial ownership of the transferred
property as a beneﬁciary under either an express or resulting trust.
Under the former construction A transfers both legal and beneﬁcial
title to B who, immediately and pursuant to the contract, declares
himself trustee of those funds in favour of A. B will hold a power
to apply the funds for the agreed purpose. This model has attracted
academic support,61 and seems to have been the basis upon which
the majority of the Lords found a trust in Twinsectra.62 Lord
Hoﬀmann made no mention of Quistclose trusts, but held that the
money Sims had received from Twinsectra was indeed held in trust:
‘‘The terms of the trust upon which Sims held the money must be
found in the undertaking which they gave to Twinsectra as a
condition of payment.’’63 That is, the trust was an express trust
with the agreement between the parties containing the requisite
certainty of intention to the eﬀect that Sims would hold that money
in trust for Twinsectra.
There should be no objection to this. As long as the necessary
intention to create a trust can be inferred from the parties’
agreement, there is no reason to deny them the relationship that
they objectively intended. One issue to consider, though, is the
identity of the settlor. In the model described above the settlor is B,
as she declares herself trustee of the property (notwithstanding that
she is contractually obliged to do so). It could also be argued that
A is the settlor and, as a result, never relinquished the beneﬁcial
interest.64 This distinction is discussed more fully below.
Resulting trust for A
A lender may also retain or acquire the beneﬁcial interest in the
transferred funds through the mechanism of a resulting trust. Here
the legal title may pass from A to B, with the beneﬁcial title
remaining in A. Alternatively full ownership may pass but, since
the funds have not yet been applied to the purpose (and B was not
intended to receive full beneﬁcial ownership), the equitable interest
immediately jumps back to A on resulting trust. In either case B
61 A. Speirs, ‘‘Escape from the Tangled Web’’ [2002] 3 Web J.C.L.I.; C.E.F. Rickett, ‘‘Quistclose
Trusts and Dishonest Assistance’’ [2002] R.L.R. 112.
62 This cannot be stated with certainty. On the trust point Lord Millett held that a resulting
trust had been created, and Lord Hoﬀmann appeared to think it was an express trust. Lord
Slynn agreed with Lord Hoﬀmann. Lord Steyn agreed with Lord Hoﬀmann and Lord
Hutton, who agreed with both Lord Hoﬀmann and Lord Millett.
63 [2002] 2 A.C. 164, at [12].
64 This may be the better view of the facts in Twinsectra: see Rickett ‘‘Quistclose Trusts and
Dishonest Assistance’’, p. 113. See also the discussion below regarding ‘‘single transactions’’
and ‘‘grant and grant-back transactions’’.
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will have a power to apply the funds for the speciﬁed purpose.
Lord Millett preferred a resulting trust model in Twinsectra:
As Sherlock Holmes reminded Dr. Watson, when you have
eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however
improbable, must be the truth. I would reject all the alternative
analyses . . . and hold the Quistclose trust to be an entirely
orthodox example of the kind of default trust known as a
resulting trust. The lender pays the money to the borrower by
way of loan, but he does not part with the entire beneﬁcial
interest in the money, and insofar as he does not it is held on
a resulting trust for the lender from the outset.65
Resulting trusts arise ‘‘whenever there is a transfer of property in
circumstances in which the transferor . . . did not intend to beneﬁt
the recipient’’.66 That is, proof that the transferor intended to retain
the beneﬁt of the property is not necessary: a resulting trust
requires only that the recipient was not intended to receive the full
beneﬁcial interest. It is argued that this requirement is satisﬁed by
the recipient, B, being under a positive duty to apply the funds for
the stated purpose. Given this major restriction on B’s use of the
property, it could hardly be claimed that she was intended to have
the full beneﬁt of the funds.67
Single transaction or grant and grant-back?
Both the express trust and resulting trust constructions involve B
receiving legal title and A holding the equitable interest. However,
there are two ways in which this end might be achieved: either the
beneﬁcial interest remains in A throughout with only the legal title
moving, or full legal title is transferred and a grant-back is made of
the equitable estate.
There is authority to the eﬀect that beneﬁcial interests cannot be
‘‘retained’’: in Re Bond Worth Ltd., Slade J. commented that the
grantor of a proprietary interest can only retain equitable interests
which are in existence at the time of the grant.68 Given that a
person solely entitled to property has only a legal title, albeit one
which carries with it equitable rights, it would seem impossible to
retain beneﬁcial ownership and the analysis must then be one of
65 [2002] 2 A.C. 164, at [100].
66 This is the ‘‘central thesis’’ of Chambers’ book Resulting Trusts; quoted with approval by
Lord Millett in Twinsectra v. Yardley [2002] 2 A.C. 164, at [92]. Note Penner’s view that it
‘‘would be unfortunate were the analytic clariﬁcation of the nature of Quistclose trusts to
depend upon the adoption of Chambers’ thesis as to the nature of resulting trusts, as
elaborated by Lord Millett, irrespective of how compelling some commentators ﬁnd it’’: J.E.
Penner, ‘‘Lord Millett’s Analysis’’ in Swadling, The Quistclose Trust, p. 52.
67 It is argued above, text to n. 53, that the important distinction which determines the location
of the equitable ownership is whether the restriction enables A to compel B to apply the
funds, or alternatively whether it merely enables A to restrain misuse.
68 [1980] 1 Ch. 228, 253.
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‘‘grant and grant-back’’.69 The House of Lords recently approved
such a construction in Westdeutsche.70
On the other hand a ‘‘single transaction’’ construction had been
adopted in Abbey National Building Society v. Cann, a case decided
only ﬁve years earlier and also by the House of Lords.71 It may
also be legitimately questioned why it is possible to transfer an
interest but not to retain one. Further, as Worthington points out,
when a resulting trust arises because of a voluntary transfer (rather
than on election to avoid a voidable contract) the correct view
seems to be that the beneﬁcial interest never left the donor.72 Of
course, Quistclose trusts are very rarely voluntary transfers: almost
invariably the borrower will provide consideration for the advance.
However, since the Quistclose analysis can be applied to a
voluntary transfer, it would seem strange to construe the
transactions diﬀerently.
It might be that this rather narrow distinction need not worry
us unduly: with express trusts the genesis of the trust will be
contained within the same agreement as that which transfers the
property, and similarly with a resulting trust model the transfer of
funds takes place at the same instant as the trust arises. Any
diﬃculties would only appear when and if the property became
beneﬁcially that of B, for there would be a risk that the property
could be enveloped by another creditor’s ﬂoating charge. If it is
accepted that this could never happen, and that the grant and
grant-back necessarily occurred eo instanti, then in the context of a
trust for A it would not matter whether the correct analysis was
one of retention or acquisition of an equitable interest.73
Express trust or resulting trust?
At ﬁrst sight it may also appear that it does not matter much
whether the device is taken to be an express or resulting trust: what
is important is that the beneﬁcial ownership of the property is in
the lender. However, there is reason to distinguish between the two:
69 See R.M. Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd ed., London 2003), p. 21. See
also n. 30 above.
70 [1996] A.C. 669.
71 [1991] 1 A.C. 56.
72 S. Worthington, Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions (Oxford 1996), p. x, referring
to R. P. Meagher and W. M. C. Gummow, Jacob’s Law of Trusts in Australia (5th ed, Sydney
1986), p. 263: ‘‘the property comes back to [the beneﬁciary] after it has been given away,
although in truth the beneﬁcial interest may never have left’’.
73 The identity of the settlor would still be relevant in a ‘‘trust for C’’ construction: if A
eﬀectively splits the estates and transfers the legal title to B at the same time as the equitable
title vests in C then B can never acquire beneﬁcial ownership. If, however, A transfers ‘‘both’’
estates to B, there may be a gap before B declares himself trustee of the property for C. It is
this gap which exposes the property to another creditor’s ﬂoating charge and may expose the
subsequent declaration of trust to avoidance as a preference. See discussion above, n. 15 and
associated text.
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whilst in either case A is an absolutely-entitled beneﬁciary, it is not
necessarily so clear that B’s duties to A would be the same. As a
beneﬁciary under an express trust A would doubtless be able to
terminate the trust and call for the property; but the law is not so
clear on the position of beneﬁciaries under resulting trusts.74
The separation of legal and equitable ownership, while creating
a trust, does not necessarily create ﬁduciary relations:75 thus a
resulting trust is not, ipso facto, a ﬁduciary arrangement. However,
as Millett points out, ‘‘the circumstances which give rise to it may
. . . be suﬃciently known to the trustee to subject him to such
obligations’’.76 It is suggested that a Quistclose situation is one of
those instances where the trustee would be suﬃciently aware of the
transferor’s intention and motivation as to make him the subject of
ﬁduciary duties.77 However, these duties need not be the same as
those owed by some conventional express trustees: in the United
States a resulting trust gives rise to some ﬁduciary obligations, at
least in relation to the trust property,78 but does not expose the
trustee to the same liabilities as an express trustee in English law.
Millett argues that the same is true in this country: that is, while all
ﬁduciaries are subject to ﬁduciary obligations, they are not all
subject to the same ﬁduciary obligations.79 It is thus argued that
the ﬁduciary duties owed by B to A could vary, depending on
whether A is the beneﬁciary under an express or resulting trust.80
If A transfers money to B and the parties agree that B is under
a positive duty to apply the funds for that purpose, then I have
argued that B will not receive beneﬁcial ownership. Rather, the
positive contractual duty will mean that the proper construction in
property law will involve A being beneﬁcially entitled and B
74 See Chambers, Resulting Trusts, pp. 196–200; A. Burrows, ‘‘Swaps and the friction between
common law and equity’’ [1995] R.L.R. 15, p. 27; P. J. Millett, ‘‘Restitution and Constructive
Trusts’’ (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 399, p. 404.
75 Millett, ‘‘Restitution and Constructive Trusts’’, discussing the comments of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in Westdeutsche v. Islington L.B.C. [1996] A.C. 669, 703.
76 Millett, ‘‘Restitution and Constructive Trusts’’, p. 405. Of course, attaching the ﬁduciary label
is not the end of the matter. As Frankfurter J. noted in S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. (1943) 318
US 80, 85–86, ‘‘to say that a man is a ﬁduciary only begins analysis . . . What obligations
does he owe as a ﬁduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And
what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?’’. This passage was quoted with
approval by Lord Mustill in Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. [1995] 1 A.C. 74, 98.
77 In the case of an express trust this could be shown by the contract containing the required
certainty of intention to create a trust. As regards resulting trusts it has been argued that the
recipient must be compelled to apply property to the purpose, and if the trustee is under such
a positive duty then we can impute knowledge as to her lender / beneﬁciary’s intentions.
78 Tricentrol Oil Trading Inc. v. Annesley (1991) 809 S.W. 2d. 218.
79 Millett, ‘‘Restitution and Constructive Trusts’’ (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 399, p. 403. See also the
comments of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 A.C.
145, 206.
80 It might also be noted, recognising the commercial nature of the great majority of these
transactions, that it would rarely be appropriate to subject express or resulting trustees to the
very strictest of duties.
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holding a ﬁduciary power. What if A promises not to revoke B’s
power to use those funds for that purpose, but then breaks that
promise and attempts to terminate the arrangement while the
purpose is still capable of fulﬁlment? This situation involves a
conﬂict between proprietary rights and contractual obligations. If
entitled under an express trust, there is little doubt that A could
successfully revoke B’s mandate and leave B to his remedy in
contract. In short, the lender’s proprietary rights will ‘‘trump’’ the
contractual rights of the recipient.81 However, if A is entitled under
a resulting trust he may not be able to exercise the same control,
owing to diﬀering ﬁduciary duties.82 Further, in a case where there
is no certainty of intention to create an express trust in favour of
A, and where A promises not to revoke B’s ability to use the
funds, it is arguable that there was never a resulting trust in the
ﬁrst place. As Chambers explains:
That contract is the indirect source of the resulting trust. The
reason why B holds the money on resulting trust for A is
because the contract between A and B prevented B from
obtaining beneﬁcial ownership of the money. If the contract
gave B an enforceable right to use the money to pay C, then B
would have a beneﬁcial interest in the money and would not
hold it wholly on resulting trust for A from the outset.83
If the terms of the agreement were clear enough to be able to infer
an intention to create an express trust for A, then a promise by A
not to revoke B’s power would not, it is submitted, undermine that
intention. However, it would undermine an inference (or indeed
rebut a presumption) that A had not intended B to have beneﬁcial
ownership. It is thus tentatively suggested that the diﬀerence
between the express and resulting trust constructions is that a
person entitled under a resulting trust is unable to terminate the
arrangement whilst the purpose is still capable of fulﬁlment.84
81 Glister, ‘‘Twinsectra v. Yardley: Trusts, Powers and Contractual Obligations’’ (2002) 16 Trust
Law International 223. It should be noted here that, although this discussion has presumed
that the transferred property would be money, there is arguably no theoretical bar to the type
of property that can be subject to a Quistclose trust: see Carreras Rothmans Ltd. v. Freeman
Matthews Treasure Ltd. [1985] 1 Ch. 207, 222 per Peter Gibson J; Worthington (1996), op. cit.,
n. 72, p. 63. This is mentioned because of the possibility of B getting speciﬁc performance of
A’s contractual duties if A should wrongly revoke B’s power to apply the funds.
82 See the sources cited above, n. 74, and the associated text.
83 Chambers, ‘‘Restrictions on the Use of Money’’, p. 86.
84 Birks takes a slightly diﬀerent view, commenting that ‘‘It is not unusual to ﬁnd the Saunders
v. Vautier right fettered by contract, but under the Twinsectra construction it must be.
Otherwise the transfer would be instantly revocable. In the absence of any express contract
there must be an implied contract not to attempt to recall the legal title so long as the
[purpose] remains in place.’’ P. Birks, ‘‘Retrieving Tied Money’’ in Swadling, The Quistclose
Trust, p. 126.
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. . . Or both?
Clearly an express trust model can by deﬁnition only be employed
in cases where there is suﬃcient certainty of intention to ﬁnd a
trust in favour A. It is not contended that such intention could
never be found in the case of a non-contract transfer, but it is
certainly true that evidence of that intention would normally be
found in the terms of the parties’ express agreement. Thus an
express trust construction could only be used in certain situations,
and in many of the older cases the requisite intention to create a
trust would seem to be lacking.85
It is therefore argued that both constructions must be
potentially valid, depending on the facts of the case. An express
trust requires intention to create a trust, while a resulting trust
analysis requires only that A did not intend B to receive full
beneﬁcial title.86 As Yeo and Tjio point out, this clearly involves ‘‘a
lower threshold for proving a trust’’.87 However, as suggested
above, the two constructions do diﬀer in their eﬀects and it would
still be more advantageous to a lender to be in the position of a
beneﬁciary entitled under an express trust.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Where A transfers property to B, so that B can pay C, several
constructions are possible. Depending on the facts of a particular
case it may be more appropriate to classify the relationship as one
of any of the following:
* Express trust for C, with B as trustee.
* Express trust for A, with B as trustee.
* Resulting trust for A, with B as trustee.
* Full ownership to B, with A holding a personal right to
restrain misuse.
* Full ownership to B, unrestricted by A.
This conclusion seeks to determine three issues: ﬁrstly, whether or
not each model concurs with established equitable principles.
Secondly it must be decided whether the diﬀering models can co-
85 See, for example, Toovey v. Milne (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 683; Hassall v. Smithers (1806) 12 Ves.
119; Gibert v. Gonard (1884) 54 L.J. Ch. 439; Re Vautin [1900] 2 Q.B. 325.
86 See the comment of Potter L.J. in the Court of Appeal decision in Twinsectra v. Yardley
[1999] EWCA Civ 1290 [1999] Lloyd’s Banking Rep. 438 at [81]: ‘‘Express trusts are
fundamentally dependent upon the intention of the parties, whereas the role of intention in
resulting trusts is a negative one, the essential question being whether or not the provider
intended to beneﬁt the recipient and not whether he or she intended to create a trust.’’ See
also the discussion above, n. 66 and associated text.
87 T. M. Yeo and H. Tjio, ‘‘The Quistclose Trust’’ (2003) 119 L.Q.R. 8, p. 12.
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exist, or whether some must necessarily contradict each other.
Finally we must identify the constructions that are ‘‘true’’ examples
of a Quistclose trust.
Non-Quistclose arrangements
Express trust for C
There are two constructions that, it is suggested, can be dealt with
quickly. The ﬁrst of these is the ‘‘trust for C’’ construction whereby
the beneﬁcial interest in the advanced funds is held on trust by the
recipient, B, for the third party, C. Such a model would be apposite
where the agreement between A and B contained the requisite
certainty of intention to create the trust for C. Under this
construction A could transfer his equitable interest directly to C, or
he could transfer full ownership to B who would subsequently
declare himself trustee of that property for C. The third party
would be an absolutely-entitled beneﬁciary under an express trust,
able to restrain misuse, terminate the trust, and possibly compel
performance.88 The identity of the settlor would be relevant in the
event that C could not be the object of a trust, but otherwise this
model is straightforward and does not pose any problems as
regards concordance with equitable principles. However, the
problem with characterising this arrangement as a Quistclose trust is
the lack of security that would be held by A. As has already been
mentioned, ‘‘the whole purpose of the arrangements . . . is to
prevent the money from passing to the borrower’s trustee in
bankruptcy in the event of his insolvency’’.89 It is thus concluded
that while such a trust would be consistent with orthodoxy, and
can exist happily without undermining the other models, it should
not properly be termed a Quistclose trust.
Unrestricted ownership to B
The second model that is also unproblematic arises where A
transfers money to B to enable B to apply those funds for a
particular purpose, but does not attempt to restrict B’s use of that
money. In this instance the full ownership of that property is
transferred to B, most commonly with B owing A an appropriate
amount under the terms of a loan agreement. A does not attempt
to retain beneﬁcial ownership, nor restrict B’s use of the money
88 As an absolutely-entitled beneﬁciary, C would be able to restrain her trustee’s misuse of the
funds. C could also terminate the trust under the principle in Saunders v. Vautier (1841) 4
Beav. 115. C would be able to compel performance if she could rely on the contract between
A and B under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. However, given that C
would be entitled to terminate the trust, a right to compel performance may not be required
anyway.
89 Twinsectra v. Yardley [2002] 2 A.C. 164, at [82] per Lord Millett.
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(although a purpose may be intended or contemplated), and thus A
does not have any security over the funds.90 Again, while such an
arrangement is clearly conceivable—and may appear similar in
some cases to a Quistclose device—given that the legal and
equitable estates are never split the device cannot properly be
termed a trust.
True Quistclose arrangements
Express trust for A
Three constructions remain: an express trust for A, a resulting trust
for A, and a situation whereby B owns the property but A holds a
personal right to restrain misuse. The ﬁrst of these is relatively
straightforward, but requires a high degree of scrutiny of the
parties’ expressed intentions. Under this model A becomes the
beneﬁciary of an express trust, the requisite certainty of intention
being contained within the parties’ transfer agreement (most
commonly a loan contract). However, there must be a clear
intention that B is to hold the funds on trust for A: a mere
intention that B is not to receive full beneﬁcial title himself is not
suﬃcient. It is in this respect that the intentions must be carefully
scrutinised: as Ulph suggests, ‘‘there is at least some risk that
promises made during negotiations for a loan could be found to
suﬃce as evidence of an intention to create a trust’’.91 That said,
should the required intention be present, there would be no reason
to deny the existence of an express trust in favour of A: such an
interpretation is clearly consistent with established principles. The
eﬀect of such an arrangement would be that A would have security
over the funds: as B would not be the beneﬁcial owner the property
would not be available to his trustee in bankruptcy. In addition to
this security in the event of his debtor’s insolvency, A would also be
able to exercise certain rights during the life of the trust through
his position as beneﬁciary: he would be able to restrain misuse and
could also bring the arrangement to a end by terminating the
trust.92
90 It may be possible for A to have de facto security through other means, but again this would
not pertain to a restriction on B’s use of that particular property.
91 J. Ulph, ‘‘Equitable Proprietary Rights in Insolvency: The Ebbing Tide?’’ [1996] J.B.L. 482,
p. 495.
92 Revoking the power would result in a pure bare trust with the trustee B holding property to
the order of the beneﬁciary A. As a matter of property law A could also compel B to
consider the exercise of the power, although A would have to rely on a contract to actually
compel B to carry out his duties. Should such personal rights exist, it may well be easier for
A to restrain misapplication through the common law, especially given that B would still be
solvent. The equitable rights would then act as a ‘‘long-stop’’.
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Resulting trust for A
An express trust for A is both conceivable and, due to A’s security,
a true example of a Quistclose trust. However, it is also argued that
such a construction is not the only one available to the courts: a
resulting trust analysis may be more appropriate. This is similar to
the express trust model in that B holds on trust for A, but it arises
in diﬀerent circumstances. Whereas an express trust construction
would require certainty of intention to create a trust for A, a
resulting trust model requires only that B was not intended to
receive full beneﬁcial ownership of the property. The beneﬁcial title
would then revert to A. It has been argued that, should B be
required to apply the funds for the purpose (rather than being
merely at liberty to do so), then this is indicative of an intention
that B should not receive full beneﬁcial title. That is, A reposes
trust and conﬁdence in B to the eﬀect that B will apply the funds,
B is fully aware of the situation, and B is thus a ﬁduciary. It
should also be noted that, unlike in an express trust situation where
the certainty of intention will nearly always need to be adduced
from a contract, a resulting trust analysis is more readily available
in the case of non-contract transfers.
Under a resulting trust, the beneﬁciary A would be able to
retrain misuse and compel application of the funds.93 However, it
has been argued that the ﬁduciary duties owed by B to A will diﬀer
if the trust is resulting, and more speciﬁcally A may not be able to
terminate the arrangement whilst the purpose is still capable of
fulﬁlment.94 Simply put, B’s ﬁduciary obligations should not extend
this far. This is the distinction between a situation where A is
entitled under an express trust and a case where the device is a
resulting trust.
A resulting trust construction satisﬁes our criteria: both models
are potentially valid in that a ﬁnding of the requisite intention to
create an express trust in one case would not preclude a resulting
trust analysis in another; analysis in this area would proceed in the
same way as any other resulting trust case; and the lender does
indeed hold security over the transferred assets.
Restricted ownership to B
The ﬁnal construction is that of B obtaining full ownership of the
transferred funds, but with A holding a personal right to restrain
misuse of those funds. This is the theory advanced by Chambers,
although he appeared to think that such an analysis was
93 By exercising personal rights under the contract and equitable rights held by virtue of his
position as beneﬁciary. See n. 87 above.
94 See above, nn. 74–80 and associated text.
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inconsistent with a resulting trust analysis.95 That is, Chambers
argued that Quistclose trusts were characterised not by an ability to
compel performance, but by the restriction of the recipient’s right
to use the property.96 This assertion has been rightly criticised,97 but
it is argued that Chambers’ theory is still valid in the cases where
there was indeed no right to compel performance. In such a
situation the lack of A’s right to compel performance would
undermine any argument that B had not been intended to gain full
beneﬁcial ownership. Thus a resulting trust would not arise. Instead
B would receive full ownership, subject to A’s personal right to
restrain misuse of the money.
Such an arrangement seems unproblematic, but it also seems to
deny A any security. Unlike beneﬁciaries under express or resulting
trusts, here the lender cannot compel the application of the funds
to the purpose: all she can do is seek an injunction to prevent
misapplication. However, it is important not to confuse a lack of
control during the life of the transaction with security on a debtor’s
insolvency. Under this construction the distinction between primary
and secondary trusts, irrelevant when dealing with trusts for the
lender, becomes important again. During the primary stage—while
the property has not been misapplied and the purpose is still
capable of fulﬁlment—the beneﬁcial title to the property is vested
in the borrower. At this stage A does intend B to have beneﬁcial
ownership. However, there is a potential secondary stage: should B
misapply some of the money, or become insolvent and thus unable
to carry out the purpose, the beneﬁcial interest will at that point
revert to A.98 The lender has very little control over the borrower
in the ﬁrst stage, but that does not mean that she has no security
in the potential second stage. Thus, although under this
construction there exists only a ‘‘secondary’’ trust, this may be
accurately described as a Quistclose trust.
Express trusts for third parties and unrestricted transfers are not
Quistclose trusts: not because they are invalid, but simply because
they do not provide security for the original lender. Although
95 It is now accepted that the models are not contradictory: Chambers, ‘‘Restrictions on the Use
of Money’’, p. 88.
96 Chambers, Resulting Trusts, p. 86.
97 See the comments of Ho and Smart, ‘‘Re-interpreting the Quistclose Trust: A Critique of
Chambers’ Analysis’’ (2001) 21 O.J.L.S. 267, p. 278; and Lord Millett in Twinsectra v. Yardley
[2002] 2 A.C. 164, at [76] and [95].
98 Regarding B misapplying the funds, see discussion above, nn. 39 and 52. The resulting trust
could also spring up when B becomes unable to apply the funds. B’s inability could be
objective: for example, the appointment of a receiver; or could be provided for in the original
contract between A and B (in much the same way as parties may choose an event that will
crystallise a ﬂoating charge in to a ﬁxed charge). In either of these cases the problem of an
initial misapplication followed by a subsequent ‘‘correct’’ application, discussed above at n.
52, does not arise.
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evidential issues may mean they are relatively rare, express trusts
for lenders are Quistclose trusts: they are entirely consistent with
established principles and provide security for the original
transferor. Resulting trusts for lenders and instances where
restricted ownership is vested in the recipient are perhaps more
worthy of discussion due to the various attempts to categorise all
Quistclose trusts as one or the other. Yet such attempts are
unnecessary: both are consistent with orthodoxy, provide adequate
security and can co-exist with each other. If A attempts to restrict
B’s use of money, but does not compel her to use that money, then
the former construction will apply. A’s ability to control B during
the primary stage will be much less than if A were a beneﬁciary,
but in the secondary stage the beneﬁcial title reverts to her under
resulting trust. If on the other hand A does have a right to compel
B to spend the money, then that is indicative of A retaining a
beneﬁcial interest. It is argued that both models are potentially
valid, with the critical distinction being A’s right to either compel
the application of funds, or merely to restrain misuse.
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